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Abstract: The market for translation services provided by individuals is currently 
characterized by significant uncertainty because buyers lack clear ways to identify 
qualified providers from amongst the total pool of translators. Certification and 
educational diplomas serve to reduce the resulting information asymmetry, but both 
suffer from potential drawbacks: translator training programs are currently 
oversupplying the market with graduates who may lack the specific skills needed in 
the market and no certification program enjoys universal recognition. In addition, the 
two may be seen as competing means of establishing qualification. The resulting 
situation, in which potential clients are uncertain about which signal to trust, is 
known as a signal jam. In order to overcome this jam and provide more consistent 
signaling, translator-training programs and professional associations offering 
certification need to collaborate more closely to harmonize their requirements and 
deliver continuing professional development (CPD) that help align the outcomes 
from training and certification. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is little doubt that the language services market (which includes 
translation and interpreting) is growing in importance. Though a recent 
survey on the status of the translation profession in the European Union 
(Pym, Grin, Sfreddo, & Chan, 2012) claims that there are about 333,000 
professional translators and interpreters in the world, the exact size and 
growth rate of the translator base are unclear. The increasing demand from a 
host of clients, ranging from financial companies to software developers, is 
more certain and has opened up many job opportunities for language service 
providers. However, we quite often hear people complaining about chaos in 
the translation market and poor translation quality. It is also sometimes said 
that it is difficult to find competent translators who can deliver a decent piece 
of work (in terms of quality, speed, and price). It is also reported that clients 
need to rely on reputation or word of mouth when finding new translators.  
 For many translation buyers, translation is more like an experienced 
good, distinguished by the fact that “its quality, and hence its value to 
consumers, cannot be precisely determined by buyers at the time of purchase” 
(Moav & Neeman, 2004, p. 1). In view of this, reputation or word of mouth 
can to some extent act as a signaling device in the translation market. 
According to Shapiro (1983), for products where quality is difficult to 
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observe prior to purchase, most buyers are willing to pay a premium for the 
seller’s investment in reputation. However, reputation may only work well 
when the market concerned is small or highly regional. As the translation 
market has begun to operate on a more global scale, the cost of information 
and finding providers is on the rise, and there is a need for more effective 
signaling devices. Translator certification and university qualifications are 
sometimes suggested as better signals for the translation market than personal 
reputation. 
 Section 2 offers a brief definition of the terms asymmetric 
information, signaling, and certification. Section 3 discusses the recent boom 
in translator certification and examines under what situations translator 
certification may not function effectively as a signal. In Section 4, the focus 
is on the signal device of a university degree or diploma, which is sometimes 
suggested as an alternative to translator certification. The problems associated 
with the use of the diploma as a signal are then discussed. The paper ends by 
suggesting how translator certification and university qualifications may 
complement each other to provide a more effective signal in the translation 
market.  
 
 
2. Asymmetric Information, Signaling and Certification 
 
Simply put, asymmetric information describes the prevalent human situations 
in which one party (the principal) has more or better information than the 
other (the agent). In a principal-agent arrangement, one person or entity acts 
on behalf of another. The former is called the agent and the latter is called the 
principal. This concept was first applied to the labor and education markets 
(Spence, 1973). In a job market, firms usually know less than workers do 
about workers’ innate productivity. Some workers may wish to signal their 
ability to potential employers, and do so by choosing a level of education that 
distinguishes them from workers with lower productivity. Therefore, 
education is sometimes considered a signal. In this way, some information 
about the workers is conveyed to the employers.   
 More precisely, the signaling theory developed by Michael Spence 
(1973, 1974, 2002) suggests that prospective employees possess two types of 
attributes: unalterable observed attributes (e.g., age and gender) and alterable 
attributes (e.g., level of education). Those alterable attributes are also called 
signals and are subject to change at the initiative of the individual. In fact, 
since the institutionalization of education in the modern era, education and 
the resulting academic qualifications and credentials have served as signals 
for organizations that make hiring decisions. Because employers do not have 
a real measure of knowledge, skills, and attitudes of job applicants, they use 
academic qualifications and other credentials as signals for making inferences 
about missing information (Barber, 1998). 
 Since corporations do not have a more accurate estimate of the future 
productivity of a potential employee, they may make the assumption that a 
potential employee who has a higher level of education possesses those 
qualities that may imply higher productivity. According to Benjamin, 
Gunderson, & Riddell (1998, p. 322), employers use education to signal 
“unobserved ability” when screening employees. The signaling theories argue 
that individuals with higher ability are more likely to obtain higher levels of 
education than those with lower ability and that the level of educational 
attainment is a reflection of the inherent abilities of the individuals.  
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 The theories of signaling have been applied to selection scenarios 
that occur in a wide range of disciplines from anthropology to zoology (for a 
comprehensive review, see Bird & Smith, 2005) and in the recent decade we 
have seen the application of asymmetric information and signaling in the 
industries of automobile insurance (Cohen, 2005), consumer credit (Karlan & 
Zinman, 2009), nursing homes (Chou, 2002), organic food products 
(Giannakas, 2002) and real estate (Garmaise & Moskowitz, 2004).  
 The concepts of asymmetric information and signaling can also be 
applied to the translation market. Due to regionalization and globalization 
trends, an increasing number of clients need translation services. However, 
because of the problem of asymmetric information, translation service buyers 
(principals) cannot effectively determine the quality of a translator (the 
agent), so some good translators may not get paid what they deserve. This has 
adversely affected the professional status of translators.  
 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, certification refers to 
“information making one certain of a fact, etc.” In real life, certification is 
widely used in various markets such as organic agricultural products and the 
IT profession. In the translation market, certification can be provided by 
public authorities (e.g., sworn translators in continental law countries are 
certified by government agencies) or private bodies. And the latter can be 
further distinguished into first-party certification, second-party certification, 
and third-party certification (Washington & Ababouch, 2011). This 
classification is further elaborated as follows: 
 
 First-party certification. A single company or stakeholder group 
develops its own certification and is therefore self-declared. 
Examples include the SDL Certification Program and translation tests 
administered by different translation companies. 
 Second-party certification. An industry or trade association 
develops certification or standards. Examples include the 
certifications offered by the American Translators Association 
(ATA) and Chartered Institute of Linguists (CIoL) in the United 
Kingdom.  
 Third-party certification. An accredited external and independent 
certification body that has no conflict of interest sets the standards for 
certification. At the moment, there is no such organization for the 
certification of translators.  
 
 
3. Translator Certification as a Signal: Scale Effect and International 
Collaboration 
 
In recent years, the issue of translator certification has attracted a great deal 
of attention among professional translators and even translation studies 
scholars. The European Commission has commissioned a study on the status 
of translators in the region and the resulting report (Pym, Grin, Sfreddo & 
Chan, 2012) devoted a significant part of its discussion to signaling and 
certification. On the other hand, many countries have developed or are in the 
process of developing their own translator certification systems. Even older 
certification systems offered by well-established professional translator 
associations (e.g., ATA and CIoL) have introduced a number of new 
initiatives, such as mandatory continuing education requirements, to further 
develop their existing system. 
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 An important variable influencing the effectiveness and status of a 
professional association is its size. Sometimes the reputation of professional 
associations may bring economic benefits to the members. For example, 
according to empirical studies in auditing, members of internationally 
renowned accounting associations can command higher auditing fees than 
those of lesser-known accounting groups (Comunale & Sexton, 2003). Of 
course, most professional associations of translators cannot claim to be large 
professional bodies if they are compared with professional associations in 
large, well-established professions such as accounting. The Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), a British chartered accountancy 
body, has 140,000 members and 404,000 students. The number of members 
in each of the two major professional translator associations, ATA and CIoL, 
is less than one-tenth that of the ACCA: ATA has about 11,000 members in 
90 countries, and CIoL has about 6,000 Fellows, Members, and Associate 
Members.  
 It may be superficial just to have a headcount, and the number of 
members is by no means the only way to judge the success or effectiveness of 
a professional association. However, it is possible that the more members a 
professional association has, the more likely it is to be recognized by its 
practitioners, other related professions, and the general public. In real life, it 
seems that professional associations of translators have the problem of 
“invisibility,”1 as the various names may not necessarily be familiar to all 
language students, people responsible for hiring translators, and the general 
public. In a small-scale survey of 29 language students in the UK, it was 
found that less than one-fifth had heard of ITI (Institute of Translation and 
Interpreting) or CIoL (Leech, 2005). And in a study of translator recruiters 
carried out by this author, one of the interviewees, a client-relationship 
manager of a large multinational translation company, even had the 
misconception that “the only requirement to become a member of the 
Chartered Institute of Linguists is to pay a membership fee” (Chan 2009, p. 
166). Therefore, we can say that the signaling effect of membership of a 
professional association of translators in general might not be very strong. 
 Having said this, closer and greater coordination among certification 
systems and professional organizations in different countries may achieve a 
scale effect on a regional or even an international level. On the education 
front, there have been a number of initiatives to harmonize translation 
degrees. A good example is the EMT (European Masters in Translation), a 
partnership project between the European Commission and higher-education 
institutions offering Master’s level translation programs. The main goal of 
this project is to establish a quality label for university translation programs 
that meet agreed standards in education. University programs that are 
benchmarked to these standards become members of the EMT network. A 
similar initiative called TransCert has also been suggested for making 
translator certifications more portable within Europe or even on an 
international level (see the Budin, Krajcso, & Lommel article in this issue). 
This initiative, if successful, may reach Level 4 in Van Damme’s (2002) 
hierarchy for international collaboration for educational institutions (this 
                                                 
 
1
 Venuti (1995) who has popularized the term “invisibility” uses it somewhat 
differently. He applies the term “to describe the translator’s situation and activity in 
contemporary Anglo-American culture” (p. 1). In short, this invisibility is produced 
by the way translators tend to translate “fluently” into English to produce an 
idiomatic target text.  
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framework can also be used for illustrating the collaboration between 
professional bodies). 
 
Van Damme’s framework can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Level Method of collaboration 
Level 4 International certification 
Level 3 Meta-certification 
Level 2 Formal mutual recognition 
Level 1 Informal exchange of information and best practices 
 
Table 1. Van Damme’s Hierarchy of International Collaboration in Professional 
Certification. 
 
On Level 1, there is a minimal strategy to improve communication and 
exchange among national certification agencies that can act as a foundation 
for the harmonization and international benchmarking of trustworthy 
standards and methodologies. On Level 2, the strategy is to develop formal 
but “soft” mutual recognition based on a mutually accepted definition of 
concepts and basic standards and criteria. The strategy for Level 3 is the 
development of real meta-certification on an international scale, but Van 
Damme (2002) admits that “[T]here is no real significant example of this for 
the moment.” Level 4 is the development of a real international certification 
agency. And Van Damme quite correctly warns that an international agency 
of this scale can be “very bureaucratic” and “costly”. Nevertheless, the 
international professional translation community should strive in the future 
for collaboration at as high a level on the Van Damme scale as feasible, in 
order to maximize the recognition and value of translator certification. 
 
 
4. Education Qualification: An Alternative to Translator Certification as 
an Effective Signal?  
 
In my interviews with translator recruiters a few years ago, quite a number of 
informants stated that a university degree is the most important criterion for 
determining applicant suitability, and they “would be inclined to find a 
candidate with a degree in translation” (Chan 2009, p. 168). However, since 
the 1990s, there has been spectacular growth in the number of translator 
training institutions. In recent years, specialized Master’s degrees in 
translation have also been mushrooming. According to Newmark’s (2006, p. 
186) observation,  
 
[T]ranslation, particularly at postgraduate level, is thriving. 
Ten years ago there were about a dozen courses. Now […]38 
universities [in the United Kingdom] are “delivering” 76 
courses, including audio-visual, screen, media and cultural 
transfer, translation and diplomacy. 
 
Six years on, a recent survey of the translation-related courses in the UK by 
Riaz (2012) shows that there is a total of 85 such MA or MSc programs, 
representing an 11% increase in half a decade. Therefore, to some extent, it is 
fair to say that vocation-oriented degrees, such as an MA in Screen 
Translation Studies (University of Surrey, first offered in September 2004) 
and an MA in Legal Translation (City University of London, first offered in 
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September 2008), are likely to compete with translator certification as a 
signaling device in the translation market. 
 Tan (2008) compares the cost of obtaining a translator certificate (in 
her case, ATA certification) and attending translation schools (Monterey 
Institute of International Studies), and finds that, although an MA degree 
costs a hefty US$45,516, in the long run ATA certification can cost as much 
as, if not more than, that when the costs of Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) over a specific period are included. Tan adds that ATA 
certification is limited in its global signaling power, as it is “only widely 
recognized in the US (and perhaps Canada), and that each country has its own 
certification system.” Of course, a degree from the Monterey Institute can 
function quite effectively as a signal in the translation market, as the degree 
qualification has been in effect for more than 50 years and the entrance 
requirements are stringent. However, other translation schools vary 
considerably in admission standards and quality. To compete for students in 
order to maintain viability, they may oversupply the market with translators. 
Thus, in general, this uncertainty about qualification and oversupply makes it 
difficult for translators to convince clients to respect their educational 
credentials. Consequently, translators’ control over their working conditions 
diminishes, and a vicious cycle of unprofessional behavior and mistrust by 
translation service buyers is initiated. This phenomenon is quite well 
documented in Tseng’s (1992) analysis of the professionalization process of 
interpreters in Taiwan, and this may be applied to the translation profession. 
 The recent proliferation of MA translation programs has been a result 
of funding policies in higher education. In Britain, Rivza and Teichler (2007) 
point out that public policies in the UK of funding higher education in 
general as well as policies of not funding the majority of foreign students 
have led to a vested financial interest on the part of higher education 
institutions to attract foreign students paying higher fees. To make the matter 
worse, the Higher Education Funding Council for England has introduced a 
total spending cut of ₤1,296 million (€1,620 million) between the academic 
year 2011/12 and 2012/13 (Evans, 2012). Taking the MSc degree at Imperial 
College, London as an example, the tuition fee for British nationals and EU 
students will be ₤7,000 (approx. €8,500) a year for 2013–14, but for overseas 
students it will be a hefty ₤11,850 (approx. €14,000). According to an email 
communication with Terri Jacques, the Course Administrator of the MSc 
Translation Program at Imperial College, for the 2007–08 academic year, the 
program had 14% non-EU international students, and the number for 2008–
09 would be “at least double as [there is] a great increase in the number of 
international applicants.” Whether these international translation students, 
after earning a Master’s degree and returning to their home countries, can be 
equipped with a better signaling credential and have more success in the job 
market is questionable. The Master’s programs in translation in the UK tend 
to be non-language specific, as they have to deal with many foreign 
languages. In addition, these programs focus on either translation 
technologies or academic translation studies and neglect translation skills. 
Prospective employers in the international students’ home countries may 
have difficulty assessing exactly what skills graduates of these programs 
possess. 
 In summary, many translator recruiters still respect academic degrees 
as a signal mechanism in the job market, but translator training schools may 
be oversupplying the translation market with academic degrees. As a result 
the translation market continues to be flooded with translators with academic 
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credentials of all levels. Employers need to have a clear idea of what a 
particular academic credential is signaling. 
 
 
5. Complementary Roles of Certification and Diplomas in Developing 
Multilateral Signaling Mechanisms 
 
The above discussion may illustrate the fact that there is currently a signal-
jamming problem in the job market for translators. In economics, a jam is 
defined as the inference problem faced by the decision-maker in an economic 
transaction (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1986, p. 367). If academic qualifications 
and professional qualifications, such as certification, are viewed as being in 
competition with each other, it is more difficult for employers to make 
inferences about job applicants’ employability from these credentials. Hence, 
there is a signal-jamming problem in the job market for translators. 
 At present, there seems to be a rigid demarcation between translator 
associations and translator training institutions. Traditionally, in the UK and 
many other countries, the connection is limited to two channels only. First, 
some translation departments are corporate members of professional 
translators’ associations. For example, the MSc Translation Program of 
Imperial College, London, is a corporate member of ITI. Second, some 
universities and associations of professional translators have signed mutual 
recognition agreements regarding their certification examinations or degree 
programs. For example, holders of the Diploma in Translation will be granted 
exemption from Module 6 (Translation Project) of the MA in Translation 
Studies at Birmingham University, and students who attain a mark of 65% or 
more in the Annotated Translation Project of the MA in Applied Translation 
Studies at London Metropolitan University will be moderated by the CIoL 
Educational Trust with a view to granting exemption from Paper 2 or 3 
(semi-specialized translation) of the Diploma in Translation. 
 However, as previously discussed, CPD (Continuing Professional 
Development) has become an increasingly important component of translator 
certification. Therefore there should be even closer collaboration between 
translator training institutions and professional translator associations. For 
instance, translator-training institutions can tailor better CPD programs in 
consultation with professional bodies and, as suggested by Cutler, 
“Translation courses… need to incorporate professional development features 
with the existing academic pathway” (2007, p. 5). 
 Translation companies, institutions that educate and train translators, 
and professional translator associations should engage in coordinated efforts 
to develop multilateral signaling mechanisms. Although in some countries 
and regions translation companies have their own association (e.g., 
Association of Translation Companies in the UK and European Union of 
Associations of Translation Companies), many professional translators’ 
associations also accept corporate members (e.g., ITI and ATA), which can 
make communication and collaboration between the corporate world and 
professional translators easier. A logical development would be for 
companies, educational institutions, and professional associations to 
communicate regularly concerning real-life activities, academic programs, 
and CPD. 
 The above coordinated efforts will have two results. First, they can 
help foster trust in an increasingly uncertain translation market. Such trust 
significantly reduces asymmetric information in the translation market as the 
future perceptions of different parties about market uncertainty decrease. 
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Second, translator training institutions and professional translators’ 
associations will be more effective in circulating knowledge. The knowledge 
can be better diffused to all that can benefit, including professional 
translators, translation companies, and other stakeholders. In this way, it may 
be easier for employers to make inferences about job applicants’ 
employability based on, e.g., CPD, and the process of recruiting translators 
can be easier, cheaper, and more time-efficient. Also, equipped with current 
knowledge and skills, translators will be better able to deal with change 
occurring in the translation industry. 
 None of the above means, however, that closer ties between training 
institutions and certification bodies are a panacea. There is a tale of caution to 
tell: in the translator market, certification and diplomas may serve to check 
and balance each other and too close a relationship between the two parties 
may actually weaken this check and balance effect. For example, the pass rate 
for the Diploma in Translation (a post-graduate qualification offered by the 
CIoL that may be taken by first-degree holders as well as anyone who is 
interested in becoming a member of the professional association) is generally 
believed to be around 30%. The CIoL has ever announced a general pass rate 
for this examination, but it is perceived to be quite difficult (German 
Translation Tips & Services, 2013). If university graduates from a translation 
program can be automatically exempted from the examination and thereby 
become a member of the organization, the signaling effect of this certification 
may well be weakened. Ideally, translator certification will be viewed as a 
valuable and desirable credential to be earned after a period of professional 
experience. The number of years of professional experience needed before 
obtaining certification should ideally be substantially less for a translator with 
an academic credential. 
 If certification is to be successful in the marketplace, it must 
demonstrate a clear signal to buyers of translation services. If certification is 
too easy or even automatic, its value will be unclear and buyers will seek 
other signaling methods. On the other hand, if it is too difficult or uncommon, 
it will not be recognized as an effective signaling device. The trick will lie in 
finding an acceptable balance that allows certification to avoid conflict 
(signal jamming) with other economic signals. 
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